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Read WikiLeaks cables Rajiv Gandhi Cables Kissinger-era Rajiv Gandhi Middleman for Swedish Jets

Read WikiLeaks cables  Rajiv Gandhi Cables Kissinger-era Rajiv Gandhi Middleman for Swedish Jets

Hindu reported about the Kissinger era and wikileaks and Rajiv Gandhi.

Hindu reported that Rajiv Gandhi may have been a middleman for the Swedish company Saab-Scania, when it was trying to sell its Viggen fighter aircraft to India in the 1970s before he became Prime Minister of India.

Rajiv Gandhi was the “main Indian negotiator” for a massive aircraft deal for which his “family” connections were seen as valuable, is contained in the Kissinger Cables.

Because of the US force, Saab withdrew and The British SEPECAT Jaguar eventually won the race.

Later Rajiv Gandhi name came up regarding
Bofors Scam and in year 1989 Congress lost the elections.
Bofors is another Swedish company.

Below are the Wikileaks cables, which discuss about Rajiv Gandhi and Gandhi family role

1-
Cable No - Canonical ID:1975NEWDE14031_b


SWEDISH NEGOTIATIONS WITH INDIANS ON VIGGEN AIRCRAFT
Date:1975 October 21, 12:25 (Tuesday)    Canonical ID:1975NEWDE14031_b

1. SWEDISH EMBOFF HAS INFORMED US THAT MAIN INDIAN NEGOTIATOR
WITH SWEDES ON VIGGEN AT NEW DELHI END HAS BEEN MRS. GANDHI'S
OLER SON, RAJIV GANDHI. LATTER'S ONLY ASSOCIATION WITH
AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY (TO OUR KNOWLEDGE) HAS BEEN AS PILOT
FOR INDIAN AIRLINES AND THIS IS FIRST TIME WE HAVE HEARD
HIS NAME AS ENTREPRENEUR.

2. SWEDISH EMBOFF SAYS THAT DASSAULT HAS SON-IN-LAW
OF INDIAN AIR MARSHALL MEHRA AS ITS CHIEF NEGOTIATOR FOR
MIRAGE SALE.
MRS. GANDHI (ACCORDING TO SWEDISH INFO) HAS MADE PERSONAL DECI-
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  NEW DE 14031  211535Z

SION NOT TO PURCHASE BRITISH JAGUAR BECAUSE OF HER PREJUDICES
AGAINST BRITISH. DECISION WOULD BE BETWEEN MIRAGE AND VIGGEN. THE
SWEDISH DIPLOMAT SAID THAT SWEDEN'S NEUTRAL POSITION IN WORLD POLI-
TICS IS OFFSETTING VIGGEN'S HIGHER COST. HE EXPRESSED
IRRITATION AT THE WAY MRS. GANDHI IS PERSONALLY DOMINATING NE-
GOTIATIONS, WITHOUT INVOLVEMENT OF INDIAN AIR FORCE OFFICERS.

3. ACCORDING TO SWEDISH EMBOFF, NEGOTIATIONS WITH SWEDES ARE
FOR 50 VIGGEN AIRCRAFT TO BE DELIVERED AT $4-5 MILLION PER
AIRCRAFT* SWEDES BELIEVE INDIANS HAVE MADE DECISION NOT TO
PURCHASE ANY MORE SOVIET MILITARY AIRCRAFT.

4. DAO COMMENT: DAO HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO EITHER
REFUTE OR CONFIRM THE ABOVE INFORMATION.
SAXBE


CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

2-
Cable No – Canonical ID:1976NEWDE01909_b



SWEDES SEE VIGGEN AGAIN ACTIVE COMPETITOR

Date:1976 February 6, 12:37 (Friday)    Canonical ID:1976NEWDE01909_b

1. THE SWEDES HERE ARE ONCE AGAIN OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THEIR
CHANCES OF SELLING THE VIGGEN TO THE INDIAN AIR FORCE.
THE SAAB SCANIA SALES MANAGER AND THE CHIEF TECHNICAL
ADVISOR, THE FORMER ACTING COMMANDER OF THE SWEDISH AIR
FORCE, RETURNED TO NEW DELHI TEN DAYS AGO FOR CONFERENCES
WITH THE INDIANS. THE TECHNICAL ADVISOR IS STILL HERE
AND WILL REMAIN AS LONG AS NECESSARY TO HANDLE QUESTIONS
FROM THE NEW INDIAN DEFENSE MINISTER AND NEW IAF CHIEF
OF THE STAFF, BOTH OF WHOM ACCORDING TO OUR SWEDISH
COLLEAGUE, REQUIRE TIME TO BRIEF THEMSELVES ON THE COMPETING
FIGHTERS.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  NEW DE 01909  061554Z


2. THE SWEDES HERE EXPECT THAT THE IAF WILL SEND A TEST
PILOT TO SWEDEN TO FLY THE VIGGEN SINCE THE CURRENT MODELS
COMING OFF THE LINE ARE AIRWORTHY. HE TELLS US THE INDIANS
HAVE ACCEPTED THE EXPLANATION FOR THE WING STRUCTURAL DEFECT
WHICH TEMPORARILY GROUNDED THE EARLY MODELS.
3. THE SWEDES BELIEVE THEIR MOST TELLING POINT, HOWEVER,
IS THE LONGEVITY OF THE AIRCRAFT. THEY SAY THEY HAVE CON-
VINCED THE IAF THAT THE REPLACEABLE AVIONICS PACKAGES IN THE
VIGGEN RENDER IT CAPABLE OF PERIODIC MODERNIZATION WITH
THE RESULT THAT IT WILL BE VIABLE UNTIL 2000 (WHICH SOUNDS
A BIT FAR FETCHED TO US). OUR SWEDISH COLLEAGUE SAID THE
PROPOSAL CONTINUES TO BE THAT THE INDIANS BUILD THE AIRFRAMES
AND POSSIBLY SOME ENGINES OR ENGINE COMPONENTS, BUT THE
SWEDES PROVIDE THE AVIONICS. SINCE THE INDIANS WANT "THE
BEST", ACCORDING TO OUR SWEDISH CONTACT, THE IAF REGARDS THE
AVIONICS AS VITAL. MOREOVER, THE SWEDES WOULD NOT CONSIDER
SELLING THE VIGGEN WITHOUT THE "BLACK BOXES." THESE FACTORS,
THE SWEDES ASSERT, GO A LONG WAY TO OFFSET THE DISADVANTAGE
OF RELATIVELY HIGH INITIAL UNIT COST. ANOTHER INDUCEMENT,
AS SEEN BY THE SWEDES HERE, IS THAT SAAB SCANIA HAS COMPLETED
ITS SURVEY OF INDIAN EXPORTS AND CONCLUDED IT COULD MARKET
SEVERAL ITEMS IN SWEDEN OR THE WEST MAKING A BARTER TYPE
ARRANGEMENT AT LEAST FEASIBLE FROM THE SWEDISH POINT OF VIEW.

4. THE SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER IS DUE ON A VISIT TO NEW
DELHI CIRCA MARCH 1. THE SWEDES ARE BRACED FOR ANOTHER
INDIAN APPEAL FOR CREDIT WHICH OUR COLLEAGUE SAYS SWEDEN
WILL NOT GRANT, BUT HE DID SAY THE MINISTER WOULD STRONGLY
SUPPORT THE VIGGEN SALE. OUR COLLEAGUE WOULD NOT SAY WHAT
OTHER CONCESSIONS THE SWEDES MAY BE CONSIDERING.

5. THE SWEDES HERE HAVE ALSO MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THEY
UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF FAMILY INFLUENCES IN THE FINAL
DECISION IN THE FIGHTER SWEEPSTAKES. OUR COLLEAGUE DESCRIBES
RANJIV GANDHI IN FLATTERING TERMS, AND CONTENDS HIS TECHNICAL
EXPERTISE IS OF A HIGH LEVEL. THIS MAY OR MAY NOT BE. OFFHAND
WE WOULD HAVE THOUGHT A TRANSPORT PILOT NOT THE BEST EXPERT
TO RELY UPON IN EVALUATING A FIGHTER PLANE, BUT THEN WE ARE
SPEAKING OF A TRANSPORT PILOT WHO HAS ANOTHER AND PERHAPS
MORE RELEVANT QUALIFICATION.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03  NEW DE 01909  061554Z

SAXBE


CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

3-
Cable No. – Canonical ID:1976STOCKH04230_b



SAAB-SCANIA REQUEST FOR U.S. PERMISSION TO EXPORT VIGGEN AND LICENSE TO INDIA

Date:1976 August 6, 14:37 (Friday)    Canonical ID:1976STOCKH04230_b

1.  IN RESPONSE TO MY REQUEST, SAAB-SCANIA PRESIDENT CURT
MILEIKOWSKY CALLED AT MY OFFICE THIS MORNING.  DRAWING
ON REFTEL, I INFORMED HIM THAT USG, AFTER CAREFUL
CONSIDERATION, HAS CONCLUDED THAT NO VERSION OF THE
VIGGEN CONTAINING ANY CLASSIFIED U.S. COMPONENTS WOULD
BE ACCEPTABLE FOR TRANSFER TO INDIA.  I SAID USG
WOULD ALSO OPPOSE ANY TRANSFER TO INDIA, FOR LOCAL
PRODUCTION, OF THE ADVANCED U.S. TECHNOLOGY REPRESENTED
IN THE VIGGEN'S AERODYNAMIC DESIGN, ENGINE AND FLYING
CONTROLS, NAVIGATION SYSTEM, ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS AND
WEAPONS SYSTEMS.  I SAID THAT ALTHOUGH A FORMAL USG
RESPONSE ON THIS ISSUE WOULD REQUIRE A FORMAL APPLICATION
BY GOS FOR REEXPORT OF U.S.-ORIGIN EQUIPMENT TO INDIA,
IN THE EVENT THE GOS WERE TO MAKE SUCH A REQUEST, A
NEGATIVE RESPONSE COULD BE ANTICIPATED.
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02        STOCKH 04230  070826Z


2.  ALTHOUGH MILEIKOWSKY WAS NOT SURPRISED AT OUR
RESPONSE, HE WAS CLEARLY DISAPPOINTED.  HIS INITIAL
REACTION WAS TO COMMENT THAT SWEDEN "MUST" SELL THE
VIGGEN ABROAD IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO AFFORD CONTINUED
PRODUCTION OF THIS SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SYSTEM.  HE
ASKED THE RHETORICAL QUESTION, "IF NOT TO INDIA, TO
WHOM CAN WE SELL THE VIGGEN?"  I REITERATED THAT USG
POLICY REMAINS THAT EACH REQUEST FROM A FOREIGN
GOVERNMENT FOR THE REEXPORT OF U.S.-ORIGIN EQUIPMENT
BE CONSIDERED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.  THEREFORE, IF
THE GOS AND SAAB-SCANIA WISHED TO MARKET THE VIGGEN
TO ANY OTHER COUNTRY, A FORMAL REQUEST SHOULD BE MADE
BY THE GOS AND IT WOULD BE GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

3.  CONTINUING, MILEIKOWSKY SAID THAT AUSTRIA WOULD BE A
POSSIBILITY AS A MARKET FOR THE VIGGEN, AND WONDERED
WHAT THE USG RESPONSE WOULD BE TO SALE OF THE VIGGEN TO
THAT COUNTRY.  I REPLIED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR
THIS EMBASSY TO SPECULATE ON WHETHER EXPORT OF THE
VIGGEN TO AUSTRIA OR ANY COUNTRY WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE,
AND REPEATED AGAIN THE NECESSITY FOR THE GOS TO MAKE
FORMAL APPLICATION IF THIS WERE ITS INTENT.

4.  MILEIKOWSKY ALSO NOTED THAT DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE
VIGGEN HAD BEEN HELD WITH THE AUSTRALIANS.  HE SAID THE
AUSTRALIANS ARE INTERESTED, BUT FOR THE NEXT COUPLE OF
YEARS WILL BE FOCUSING THEIR DEFENSE EFFORTS ON
DEVELOPMENT AND PURCHASE OF ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
EQUIPMENT.  HOWEVER, MILEIKOWSKY CONTINUED, THE
AUSTRALIANS HAVE INDICATED THEY MIGHT BE INTERESTED
IN PURCHASE OF THE VIGGEN "IN TWO OR THREE YEARS."
HE NOTED THAT SWEDES HAD IN MIND A SPECIAL VERSION
OF THE VIGGEN, ADAPTED TO AUSTRALIAN NEEDS, IF THE
ORDER WERE OBTAINED.  I COMMENTED THAT WHILE I COULD
NOT PREDICT THE RESPONSE TO A SWEDISH REQUEST TO MARKET
THE VIGGEN TO AUSTRALIA, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I FELT THAT
SOME OF THE OBJECTIONS PRESENT IN THE INDIAN CASE WOULD
NOT RPT NOT BE PERTINENT RE POSSIBLE SALES TO AUSTRALIA.
AGAIN I EMPHASIZED THAT EACH APPLICATION WOULD BE
CONSIDERED ON ITS OWN MERITS.
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03        STOCKH 04230  070826Z


5.  MILEIKOWSKY THANKED ME, AND SAID SAAB-SCANIA WOULD
HAVE TO COME UP WITH ALTERNATIVE MARKETS TO INDIA FOR
EXPORT OF THE VIGGEN.  I ASSURED HIM WE WOULD CONSIDER
ANY FORMAL APPLICATION BY THE GOS CAREFULLY.  WE WILL
ALSO NOTIFY THE MFA OF US DECISION.
SMITH

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

SECRET
NNN

4-
Cable No – Canonical ID:1976STOCKH04231_b


IMPLICATIONS OF SAAB-SCANIA REQUEST FOR U.S. PERMISSION TO EXPORT VIGGEN TO INDIA

Date:1976 August 6, 14:38 (Friday)    Canonical ID:1976STOCKH04231_b

(DTG 041343Z)(NOTAL)

1.  AS REPORTED IN REF A, I HAVE NOTIFIED SAAB-SCANIA
PRESIDENT MILEIKOWSKY OF NEGATIVE USG RESPONSE TO
INFORMAL REQUEST FOR EXPORT OF VIGGEN AIRCRAFT TO INDIA
AND LICENSE TO MANUFACTURE SUCH AIRCRAFT TO INDIA.

2.  I AM DISTURBED BY THE IMPLICATIONS CONTAINED IN PARA
THREE, REF B, WHICH STATES THAT USG HAS INTERPRETED
GOS DESIRE FOR MILITARY COOPERATION WITH US AS
REFLECTING SWEDISH DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN A
CREDIBLE DEFENSE POSTURE OF ITS OWN AND NOT RPT NOT FOR
THE PURPOSE OF THIRD COUNTRY EXPORTS. SAME PARA NOTES
THAT USG WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE MILITARY COOPERATION
HAS BEEN BASED ON ASSUMPTION THAT US MILITARY R&D
WOULD NOT BE TRANSFERRED TO THIRD COUNTRIES, AND RAISES
QUESTION AS TO WHETHER GOS POLICY IN THESE AREAS IS
CHANGING.

3.  IT IS THE FIRM CONVICTION OF THE COUNTRY TEAM THAT
THERE HAS BEEN NO RPT NO CHANGE IN SWEDISH OBJECTIVES.
BASIC SWEDISH AIM REMAINS TO MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE MILITARY
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02        STOCKH 04231  070859Z

FORCE AS DETERRENT TO POTENTIAL SOVIET ATTACK. THIS
DETERRENT HAS BEEN BASED ON SWEDEN'S MOST ADVANCED
WEAPONS SYSTEMS, THE SUPERSONIC VIGGEN AJ-37. IN VIEW OF
HEAVY UNIT COST OF SUCH SOPHISTICATED AIRCRAFT, SWEDES
HAVE STUDIES POSSIBILITIES OF LIGHTENING THIS BURDEN
BY EXPORTING VIGGEN TO CAREFULLY SELECTED COUNTRIES
ABROAD, AND APPROACH BY SAAB-SCANIA REFLECTED THIS
EFFORT TO MARKET VIGGEN ABROAD, WITHIN GUIDELINES OF
SWEDISH ARMS EXPORT POLICY.

4.  IN THEIR CONVERSATIONS WITH US, SENIOR SWEDISH
OFFICIALS HAVE EMPHASIZED THAT MOST IMPORTANT
CONSIDERATION TO GOS HAS BEEN THE PRESERVATION OF
COOPERATION WITH US ON MILITARY R&D, WHICH THEY
RECOGNIZE AS VITAL TO MAINTENANCE OF A VIABLE SWEDISH
DEFENSE EFFORT. THEY HAVE ALSO STRESSED THAT SALE OF
VIGGEN TO INDIA WAS OF SECONDARY CONSIDERATION TO THEM
IN COMPARISON WITH VALUE OF MILITARY COOPERATION WITH U.S.
BOTH ANDERS THUNBORG, SECRETARY OF STATE AND CHAIRMAN OF
ROYAL DEFENSE COMMISSION, AND KNUT THYBERG, MFA OFFICIAL
RESPONSIBLE FOR ARMS EXPORTS, HAVE MADE THIS POINT TO
ME AND TO SENIOR MEMBERS OF MY STAFF. THE FACT THAT
APPROACH TO THE EMBASSY ON POSSIBLE EXPORT OF VIGGEN TO
INDIA WAS MADE BY SAAB-SCANIA AND NOT BY SWEDISH
GOVERNMENT, REFLECTED NOT ONLY RELUCTANCE OF GOS TO
SELL VIGGEN TO INDIA BUT ALSO DETERMINATION OF GOS NOT
TO TAKE ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD JEOPARDIZE OUR
COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP.

5.  IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, WE SEE NO RPT NO BASIS FOR
INFERRING THAT APPROACH BY SAAB-SCANIA TO EXPORT VIGGEN
REFLECTED ANY CHANGE WHATSOVER IN EITHER SWEDISH ARMS
EXPORT POLICY OR, MORE IMPORTANTLY, ON VALUE WHICH
GOS ACCORDS TO OUR COOPERATION IN FIELD OF MILITARY R&D.

6.  WITH REGARD TO ALLEGED TRANSFER OF SWEDISH BUILT LASER
RANGE FINDERS FROM YUGOSLAVIA TO EGYPT, WE ARE NOT IN A
POSITION HERE TO VERIFY WHETHER SUCH EQUIPMENT ACTUALLY
TURNED UP IN EGYPT. HOWEVER, SENIOR MFA OFFICIAL
(THYBERG) AS WELL AS MANUFACTURER, FLATLY DENIED SUCH
REPORTS TO US IN APRIL, AND ASSERTED THAT GOS WOULD
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03        STOCKH 04231  070859Z

REGARD RE-EXPORT OF SUCH DEVICES BY YUGOSLAVIA AS
VIOLATION OF "UTMOST SERIOUSNESS." (STOCKHOLM 1948).
WE ARE AWARE OF SUCH REPORTS FROM BELGRADE AND TEL AVIV,
BUT TO BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, THEY HAVE NEVER BEEN
CONFIRMED. PENDING SUCH CONFIRMATION, WE DO NOT
BELIEVE SWEDES SHOULD BE FAULTED FOR SUCH ALLEGED
TRANSFERS.

7.  IN SUM, WHILE WE AGREE WITH DEPARTMENT'S INFORMAL
DECISION TO REFUSE SAAB-SCANIA PERMISSION TO EXPORT
VIGGEN TO INDIA, WE DO NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE THAT THE
REQUEST ITSELF SHOULD BE INTERPRETED AS IMPLYING ANY
WEAKENING OF SWEDISH DESIRE TO PRESERVE ITS MILITARY
COOPERATION WITH US OR ITS DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN A
CREDIBLE DEFENSE POSTURE. AS SET FORTH IN OUR U.S.
POLICY ASSESSMENT AND CONFIRMED BY DEPARTMENT'S
STATEMENTS OF U.S. POLICY TOWARDS SWEDEN (STOCKHOLM 1572)
AND STATE 180863), ONE OF OUR PRINCIPLE GOALS IN
SWEDEN IS THE PRESERVATION OF AN INDEPENDENT, MILITARILY
STRONG SWEDEN. TO ACHIEVE THIS AIM, IT IS ESSENTIAL
THAT THE USG CONTINUE TO MAKE AVAILABLE OUR MILITARY
R&D TO THE SWEDES.
SMITH

NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O, MR. OTTO.

SECRET

NNN

5-
Cable No - Canonical ID:1974LONDON00554_b


BRITISH MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIA
Date:1974 January 14, 15:42 (Monday)    Canonical ID:1974LONDON00554_b

SUMMARY:  INDIANS HAVE NEARLY COMPLETED NEGOTIATIONS
FOR TWO NAVY CORVETTES AND UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF JAGUAR
AIRCRAFT THOUGH NEGOTIATIONS TEMPORARILY STALLED BE-
CAUSE OF OIL CRISIS.  ALSO DISCUSSED HARRIER VTO AIR-
CRAFT.  NEW DEFSEC GILMOUR LIKELY TO VISIT INDIA IN
NEAR FUTURE.  END SUMMARY

1.  ON JANUARY 11 FCO SOUTH ASIAN DEPT. HEAD CHALMERS
FILLED US IN ON STATE OF BRITISH ARMS SUPPLY TALKS
WITH INDIANS.  HE SAID INDIANS HAD EXPRESSED DESIRE
FOR MODEST ALTERNATIVE TO SOVIETS AS ARMS SUPPLY SOURCE,
AND HAD BEGUN DISCUSSIONS WITH BRITISH EARLY LAST SUM-
MER.
SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 02  LONDON 00554  01 OF 02  141602Z


2.  OIL CRISIS, AND CONSEQUENT INDIAN BUDGETARY UNCER-
TAINTIES, INTERRUPTEDNEGOTIATIONS FOR SEVERAL ITEMS.
MOST ADVANCED WAS DEAL FOR TWO NEW NAVY CORVETTES
AMOUNTING TO ABOUT 30 MILLION POUNDS.  CORVETTES WOULD
TAKE 3-4 YEARS TO BUILD, AND INDIANS HAD AGREED TO
NORMAL BRITISH CREDIT TERMS (IN NEIGHBORHOOD OF 5 YEARS,
HE THOUGHT).  INDIAN CABINET HAD APPROVED DEAL.

3.  SOMEWHAT LESS ADVANCED (NOT APPROVED BY INDIAN
CABINET NOR CREDIT TERMS DISCUSSED) WAS DEAL FOR
JAGUAR AIRCRAFT (HE DID NOT KNOW EXACT NUMBER) OF VALUE
IN NEIGHBORHOOD OF 30-35 MILLION POUNDS.  THIS WOULD
PROBABLY BE ONLY FIRST TRANCHE OF AN ONGOING PROGRAM
WHICH COULD REACH 100-120 MILLION POUNDS OVER PERIOD
OF TIME.  INDIAN MANUFACTURE OF SOME PARTS ENVISAGED FOR
LATER PROGRAM.

4.  MARITIME HARRIER VERTICAL TAKE-OFF AIRCRAFT AMONG
SEVERAL OTHER ITEMS DISCUSSED BUT NO DECISIONS TAKEN.
HE CONFIRMED THAT DAILY TELEGRAPH ITEM OF JANUARY 4
(REFTEL) WAS ERRONEOUS IN SAYING INDIANS HAD DECIDED
AGAINST HARRIERS.  HE ALSO SAID IT WAS PREMATURE TO
SPECULATE ON NUMBERS AND VALUE.  LEAD TIME LIKELY TO
BE 5-8 YEARS ANYWAY.  (NOTE:  CHALMERS INTIMATED THAT
AN ORDER FOR HARRIERS FROM IRAN IS LIKELY TO TAKE
PRECEDENCE.)

5.  CHALMERS ADDED THAT TWO OFFICIAL BRITISH VISITS
TO INDIA HAD BEEN SCHEDULED BUT THEN POSTPONED.  IN
MID-JANUARY IAN GILMOUR, FORMERLY MINISTER OF STATE
FOR DEFENSE, WAS TO HAVE VISITED INDIA AT INVITATION OF
DEFENSE PRODUCTION MINISTER SHUKLA.  SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DEFENSE CARRINGTON WAS TO HAVE FOLLOWED WITH A VISIT




SECRET

NNN

6
Cable No. – Canonical ID:1974LONDON00554_b



BRITISH MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIA
Date:1974 January 14, 15:42 (Monday)    Canonical ID:1974LONDON00554_b

SUMMARY:  INDIANS HAVE NEARLY COMPLETED NEGOTIATIONS
FOR TWO NAVY CORVETTES AND UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF JAGUAR
AIRCRAFT THOUGH NEGOTIATIONS TEMPORARILY STALLED BE-
CAUSE OF OIL CRISIS.  ALSO DISCUSSED HARRIER VTO AIR-
CRAFT.  NEW DEFSEC GILMOUR LIKELY TO VISIT INDIA IN
NEAR FUTURE.  END SUMMARY

1.  ON JANUARY 11 FCO SOUTH ASIAN DEPT. HEAD CHALMERS
FILLED US IN ON STATE OF BRITISH ARMS SUPPLY TALKS
WITH INDIANS.  HE SAID INDIANS HAD EXPRESSED DESIRE
FOR MODEST ALTERNATIVE TO SOVIETS AS ARMS SUPPLY SOURCE,
AND HAD BEGUN DISCUSSIONS WITH BRITISH EARLY LAST SUM-
MER.
SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 02  LONDON 00554  01 OF 02  141602Z


2.  OIL CRISIS, AND CONSEQUENT INDIAN BUDGETARY UNCER-
TAINTIES, INTERRUPTEDNEGOTIATIONS FOR SEVERAL ITEMS.
MOST ADVANCED WAS DEAL FOR TWO NEW NAVY CORVETTES
AMOUNTING TO ABOUT 30 MILLION POUNDS.  CORVETTES WOULD
TAKE 3-4 YEARS TO BUILD, AND INDIANS HAD AGREED TO
NORMAL BRITISH CREDIT TERMS (IN NEIGHBORHOOD OF 5 YEARS,
HE THOUGHT).  INDIAN CABINET HAD APPROVED DEAL.

3.  SOMEWHAT LESS ADVANCED (NOT APPROVED BY INDIAN
CABINET NOR CREDIT TERMS DISCUSSED) WAS DEAL FOR
JAGUAR AIRCRAFT (HE DID NOT KNOW EXACT NUMBER) OF VALUE
IN NEIGHBORHOOD OF 30-35 MILLION POUNDS.  THIS WOULD
PROBABLY BE ONLY FIRST TRANCHE OF AN ONGOING PROGRAM
WHICH COULD REACH 100-120 MILLION POUNDS OVER PERIOD
OF TIME.  INDIAN MANUFACTURE OF SOME PARTS ENVISAGED FOR
LATER PROGRAM.

4.  MARITIME HARRIER VERTICAL TAKE-OFF AIRCRAFT AMONG
SEVERAL OTHER ITEMS DISCUSSED BUT NO DECISIONS TAKEN.
HE CONFIRMED THAT DAILY TELEGRAPH ITEM OF JANUARY 4
(REFTEL) WAS ERRONEOUS IN SAYING INDIANS HAD DECIDED
AGAINST HARRIERS.  HE ALSO SAID IT WAS PREMATURE TO
SPECULATE ON NUMBERS AND VALUE.  LEAD TIME LIKELY TO
BE 5-8 YEARS ANYWAY.  (NOTE:  CHALMERS INTIMATED THAT
AN ORDER FOR HARRIERS FROM IRAN IS LIKELY TO TAKE
PRECEDENCE.)

5.  CHALMERS ADDED THAT TWO OFFICIAL BRITISH VISITS
TO INDIA HAD BEEN SCHEDULED BUT THEN POSTPONED.  IN
MID-JANUARY IAN GILMOUR, FORMERLY MINISTER OF STATE
FOR DEFENSE, WAS TO HAVE VISITED INDIA AT INVITATION OF
DEFENSE PRODUCTION MINISTER SHUKLA.  SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DEFENSE CARRINGTON WAS TO HAVE FOLLOWED WITH A VISIT




SECRET
NNN

7-
Cable No. – Canonical ID:1975STATE270066_b


INDIAN INTEREST IN NEW-GENERATION AIRCRAFT
Date:1975 November 14, 01:57 (Friday)    Canonical ID:1975STATE270066_b

STOCKHOLM 5758 (NOTAL)

1.  WE ARE STILL ASSESSING EXTENT TO WHICH USG HAS
CONTROL OVER SALE OF SWEDISH VIGGEN TO INDIA.  THIS IS
A TECHNICALLY COMPLICATED PROBLEM, SINCE THE VIGGEN CON-
TAINS A LARGE NUMBER OF PARTS AND COMPONENTS OF U.S.
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02  STATE  270066

ORIGIN, WHICH ARE THEREFORE SUBJECT TO USG CONTROL IN
THIRD PARTY SALES.  IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO ASCERTAIN
EXACTLY WHERE WE ARE ON THIS.  (TO BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE,
WE HAVE NO VETO ON SALE OF BRITISH-FRENCH JAGUAR TO INDIA.)

2.  SINCE IT LOOKS AS IF GOI MAY IN ANY CASE BE INCLINED
TOWARD JAGUAR, WE WOULD LIKE TO DEFER FORMAL USG DECISION
ON VIGGEN SALE IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO
OUR RELATIONS WITH BOTH INDIA AND SWEDEN IN EVENT WE
WOULD DECIDE NOT TO APPROVE.  NO POLICY DECISION HAS BEEN
TAKEN ON THIS CASE YET, BUT THE FACT THAT WE HAVE BEEN
UNWILLING TO SELL SOPHISTICATED COMBAT AIRCRAFT TO
PAKISTAN WOULD HAVE SIGNIFICANT BEARING.

3.  IN TALKING WITH SWEDES, THEREFORE, YOU SHOULD NOT
ENCOURAGE THEM TO SUBMIT A FORMAL REQUEST.  IN ADDITION
TO NOTING THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO YES OR NO FROM
WASHINGTON, YOU MAY ADD THAT, BECAUSE OF TECHNICAL COM-
PLEXITIES OF CASE, YOU DO NOT EXPECT AN EARLY INDICATION
OF WASHINGTON'S POSITION.   KISSINGER


SECRET

NNN

8-
Cable No – Canonical ID:1975NEWDE15350_b


BRITISH CONCESSION ON JAGUAR FINANCING
Date:1975 November 19, 12:11 (Wednesday)    Canonical ID:1975NEWDE15350_b

1.  A BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION OFFICER TOLD US NOVEMBER
19 THAT THE BRITISH JAGUAR IS STILL VERY MUCH IN THE
RUNNING IN THE INDIAN AIR FORCE (IAF) SWEEPSTAKES.
LONDON HAS NOW DECIDED TO OFFER THE GOVERNMENT OF
INDIA A MORE FAVORABLE FINANCING ARRANGEMENT,  7 1/4
PERCENT OVER FIVE YEARS, THAN WAS EARLIER THE CASE.  THE
GOI HAS ASKED FOR TWO PERCENT OVER 15 YEARS, BUT THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  NEW DE 15350  200103Z

BRITISH TELL US THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE.  THE GOI STILL
WANTS 40 AIRCRAFT TO BE DELIVERED WITHIN 36 MONTHS.
THE ORIGINALBRITISH OFFER WAS 60 MONTHS, BUT THEY ARE
NOW TALKING IN TERMS OF 40 ODD MONTHS.

2.  THE NEXT MOVE IN THE PROCESS WILL BE A BRITISH
REPLY TO A LETTER FROM THE INDIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER
IN LONDON.  THE RESPONSE, NOT YET DELIVERED, WILL BE
ALONG THE LINES OF PARAGRAPH ONE. IN THE INTERIM A
BRITISH AIRCRAFT COMPANY TEAM IS STILL IN NEW DELHI
ANSWERING TECHNICAL QUESTIONS.

3.  THE BRITISH STILL BELIEVE THEY HAVE THE BEST PRO-
DUCT AND REMAIN THE FAVORITE OF THE IAF, BUT THEY
ACKNOWLEDGE THE VIGGEN REMAINS IN COMPETITION.  THE
HIGH COMMISSION HERE SEES THE FINAL DECISION AS
POLITICAL AND EXPECT IT TO BE MADE BY THE PRIME
MINISTER.  WE CONCUR IN THAT ASSESSMENT.
SAXBE


CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

9
Cable No – Canonical ID:1975PARIS33184_b


FRENCH PRIME MINISTER TO VISIT INDIA IN JANUARY
Date:1975 December 19, 12:40 (Friday)    Canonical ID:1975PARIS33184_b

1.  MICHEL DE BONNECORSE, ASSISTANT DIPLOMATIC ADVISER
TO PRIME MINISTER CHIRAC, HAS JUST RETURNED FROM WEEK'S
STAY IN INDIA. HE WAS THERE TO PREPARE PRIME MINISTER'S
OFFICIAL VISIT WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE DURING WEEK OF
JANUARY 20.  DE BONNECORSE TOLD US THAT DATE OF VISIT
WAS AGREED UPON LAST AUGUST.  CHIRAC IS LESS
ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE VISIT NOW THAN HE WAS LAST
SUMMER BECAUSE OF HIS CONCERN OVER ADVERSE INTERNAL
FRENCH POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS.  ACCORDING TO DE
BONNECORSE, THE GOF FEELS THAT MRS. GANDHI'S ADVANCE
TOWARD DICTATORSHIP IS NOW IRREVERSIBLE, AND CHIRAC
IS UNHAPPY WITH THE IDEA OF APPEARING TO CONDONE THIS
DEVELOPMENT THROUGH HIS OFFICIAL VISIT.

2.  DE BONNECORSE SAID HE MET A GOOD SAMPLING OF
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PAGE 02  PARIS 33184  191249Z

INDIAN  INTELLECTUALS DURING HIS VISIT, AND WAS IM-
PRESSED BY THE OVERWHELMINGLY NEGATIVE COMMENTS ABOUT
MRS. GANDHI.  HE QUOTED BOMBAY BUSINESSMEN AS TELLING
HIM THAT THEY WERE HAPPY WITH THEIR PRIME MINISTER'S
INITIAL ACTIONS IN DECLARING A STATE OF EMERGENCY, BUT
ARE NOW ON THE VERGE OF WITHDRAWING THEIR SUPPORT.
(COMMENT: WE ARE OBVIOUSLY NOT IN A POSITION TO
EVALUATE THIS ANALYSIS, BUT DE BONRECORSE'S OBSERVATIONS
WILL CLEARLY CARRY WEIGHT WITH TOP LEVELS OF GOF.)

3.  THE VISIT ITSELF IS NOT LIKELY TO RESULT IN ANY
IMPORTANT NEW AGREEMENTS, DE BONNECORSE SAID.  THE GOF
HOPES TC STRENGTHEN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TIES IN THE
ELECTRONICS FIELD SO AS TO ENHANCE EXPORT
OPPORTURITIES.

4.  ON THE QUESTION OF A NEW FIGHTER AIRCRAFT FOR THE
INDIAN AIR FORCE, (REFTEL), DE BONNECURSE SAID IT WAS
NOT EXPECTED THAT A DECISION WILL HAVE BEEN MADE
BEFORE CHIRAC'S VISIT.  IN FACT, CHIRAC HOPES TO BE
ABLE TO BOOST SALES PROSPECTS FOR THE MIRAGE F-1
DURING HIS VISIT.  ON THE BASIS OF AVAILABLE INFORMA-
TION, THE MIG-23 APPEARS TO BE THE FRONTRUNNER, DE
BONNECORSE SAID.  HE SAID THIS IS TRUE FOR BOTH
POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL REASONS.  THE GOF IS NOW
DEBATING TWO TACTICAL OPTIONS DE BONNECORSE INDICATED--
PLACE FULL WEIGHT BEHIND THE MIRAGE, OR SWITCH TO THE
JAGUAR IN THE HOPE THAT COMBINED BRITISH AND FRENCH
INFLUENCE WILL PREVAIL.  THERE IS A BODY OF OPINION
IN THE GOF WHICH ARGUES THAT THE "BRITISH LOBBY" IN
INDIA IS INFLUENTIAL, AND THAT THE ONLY CHANCE FOR
DEFEATING THE MIG LIES IN A JOINT ANGLO-FRENCH
EFFORT.  DE BONNECORSE SAID THAT INDIAN AIR FORCE
/ILOTS ARE CURRENTLY IN FRANCE TEST FLYING THE MIRAGE.
RUSH


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10-
Cable No – Canonical ID:1976NEWDE00845_b


NO DECISION YET IN IAF FIGHTER SWEEPSTAKES
Date:1976 January 16, 12:18 (Friday)    Canonical ID:1976NEWDE00845_b

1. WITHIN THE PAST WEEK BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER MICHAEL
WALKER HAS SPOKEN  TO DEFENCE MINISTER BANSI LAL ABOUT THE
JAGUAR. LAL WANTED PRECISE FIGURES ON TERMS, PRICES, DE-
LIVERY DATES FOR THE JAGUAR. THE DEFENCE MINISTER ALSO TOLD
THE BRITISH THAT THE FRENCH MIRAGE WAS STILL VERY MUCH IN
CIMPETITION, AND THAT HE ANTICIPATED A NEW FRENCH OFFER. SIR
MICHAEL INTENDS TO SEE DEFENCE SECRETARY KOHLI IN THE NEAR
FUTURE AND SAY THAT BRITIAN IS PREPARED TO DELIVER THE FIRST
20 TO 24 AIRCRAFT ON CREDIT, THE TERMS TO BE FIVE YEARS AT
6 1/2 TO 8 1/2 PERCENT. THE BRITISH WILL DELIVER THE
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PAGE 02  NEW DE 00845  161456Z

MAXIMUM NUBER 24, ONLY IF THE FRENCH CONCUR IN THE CREDIT
ARRANGEMENT.

2. THE FRENCH BELIEVE THEIR CHANCES ARE STILL EXCELLENT-
FRENCH PRIME MINISTER CHIRAC WILL DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH
MRS GANDHI DURING HIS VISIT, JANUARY 23 TO 26, BUT THE
FRENCH EMBASSY HERE DOES NOT EXPECBT THE MATTER TO BE RESOLVED
DURING THAT VISIT. THE FRENCH UNDERSTAND THE INDIAN TEAM
WAS PLEASED BY THE RESULTS OF THEIR VISIT TO FRANCE, BUT MORE
AND MORE THE FRENCH EMBASSY HERE IS CONVICED THAT IT IS
PRIME MINISTER GANDHI ALONE WHO WILL MAKE THE FINAL DECISION,
WHICH THE FRENCH ASSERT WILL BE ON POLIO CAL GROUNDS. OUR
FRENCH EMBASSY CONTACT AGAIN REPATED THE FRENCH ASSESSMENT
THAT THE SOVIETS ARE VERY MUCH IN THE RUNNING AND ARE ENER-
GETICALLY PUSHING THE LATE MODEL MIG AIRCRAFT. THE FRENCH SEE
SOME MIX IN THE INDIAN SELECTION AS AS POSSIBLE. THE FRENCH
ALSO BELIEVE THE SWEDES HAVE REDUCED THEIR PRICES AND OFFERED
TO TAKE RUPEES IN PAYMENT, BUT OUR FRENCH CONTACT COULD NOT
OR WOULD NOT GIVE THE BASIS FOR THIS CONCLUSION.

3. MEANWHILE THE SWEDES HERE ARE KEEPING UP A BRAVE FRONT,
ALTHOUGH THEY ARE THE LEAST OPTIMISTIC OF THE COMPETITIORS.
THE INDIANS ALSO WENT TO STOCKHOLM AND LOOKED AT THE
VIGGEN, EVEN IF UNABLE TO FLY IT. THE SWEDISH SAAB SCANIA TEAM
RETURNED TO SWEEDEN BEFORE CHRISTMAS, AND HAS MADE NO
PROVISION TO RE-TURN TO INDIA. THE SWEDISH EMBASSY TELLS
US THERE ARE NO CONCESSIONARY CREDIT POSSIBLITIES, ALTHOUGH
THE INDIANS HAVE CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR SOFT TERMS. THE
SWEDES SAID THEY WOULD GIVE THE INDIANS SOME MINIMAL MARKETING
ASSISTANCE IN SWEDEN, BUT RUPEE PAYMENTS WERE NOT MENTIONED BY
OUR CONTACT. UNDER THE LAST DISCUSSED ARRANGEMENT, THE SWEDES
WOULD DELIVER THE FIRST 24 TO 36 AIRCRAFT TO INDIA. THE
NEXT AIRCRAFT WOULD BE ASSEMBLED HERE UNDER LICENSE. AT
THE SAME TIME THE INDIANS WOULD ALSO BEGIN TO PRODUCE SOME
COMPONENTS HERE. THE SWEDES WOULD UNDERTAKE TO PURCHASE
SOME OF THE LATTER FOR USE IN SWEDEN, THE SWEDES SAY THE
INDIANS HAVE NEVER DISCUSSED A TOTAL ORDER FIGURE.
SAXBE


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Monday, April 08, 2013

Tags – Rajiv Gandhi Bofors Case Wikileaks

8 comments:

MEcoy April 08, 2013  

another interesting topic sm

Kirtivasan Ganesan April 09, 2013  

as long as a pilot is unaffected by all these politics it is fine.

DWei April 09, 2013  

I can see why some groups would want to shut Wikileaks down.

rudraprayaga April 09, 2013  

That family extracts the juice of India.Informative.