17 June 2010

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Past Performance of Pune Municipal Corporation - Metro will it be success? CAG Report and Delhi Metro Pune Citizens should know about it

Past Performance of Pune Municipal Corporation - Metro will it be success? CAG Report and Delhi Metro Pune Citizens should know about it -

Reality Views by sm –
Thursday, June 17, 2010

BRT in Gujarat is success and BRT in Pune failed

Do you know which officer or contractor got punished for the failure of BRT project Pune city?

Cycle tracks: Failed millions wasted.
Where is cycle track in Pune city?
Do you know which officer or contractor got punishment for this failure of cycle track?

River-bed road –
Cheonggyecheon project, Seoul and Sabarmati project,
Ahmedabad) are striving to make their rivers beautiful and accessible to its people, PMC wants to build an elevated road over the river from Kothrud to Kharadi!
Whose job was it to improve the river’s water flow and provide
A pleasant environment both for life-forms in the river and life-forms around it (a.k.a. Punekars)?

Balbharti-Paud road:
What PMC achieved Reason was reduction in traffic, visit the road and travel and see that what we got.

Baner Aundh Road -
Delayed project.

Pune city Games -
Games were finished but camera and wireless internet did not work still.

PMC totally failed in following areas of transport –
Bus utility failed.
Cycle tracks failed.
Footpaths barely exist.
BRT failed

Metro Project 2010 - what I should write,
In advance Failed if starts or pass if starts?

Just hope if this project starts someone like Arun Bhatia should be made in charge of
Pune Metro Project.

Watch the Film on state of pedestrian facilities in Pune made in 2009
The film was conceptualized and shot by Susan Michet, an American student intern during her time in Pune in May 2009. The Alliance for Global Education funded Susan's stay and work in Pune, Janwani provided the office space and infrastructure, while Parisar provided the inputs regarding the content of the film. We also acknowledge Hema Gadgil's contribution of her voice-over to the film.

Important Facts - Delhi Metro and Few findings of CAG Report –
From the CAG Report I have mentioned all the important factors here, which citizens of Pune should know so that Pune Metro Project should not be written as FAILED.
Today or Tomorrow PMC and PCMC will start this project without the participation of people of Pune.
PSUs - Implementation of Phase I of Delhi Mass Rapid Transit System
By Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Limited]
(Performance Audit - Report-17 of 2008)

1. The highest daily average rider ship attained by the company was 21 per cent of the original projections and 29 per cent of the revised figure.
2. A DPR is only meant as a tool for planning and monitoring for construction
3. Activity and can seldom serve as a surrogate corporate plan as unforeseen events may often render the initial projections invalid. Moreover, a formal duly approved Corporate Plan serves as a written guidance for all the officials of the company and promotes a favorable control environment for the achievement of corporate objectives. It is best practice to have the Corporate Plan and, unless specifically exempted, the company should also adopt the other guidelines of the DPE, the DEA and the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) for more robust corporate governance.

4. The shortfall in rider ship was mainly due to higher fare structure, lack of proper connectivity and lack of feeder bus system.
5. There is a need to develop a suitable mechanism at the national level for
6. Projects of this nature so that accountability issues are not placed at unreasonable risk in the interests of expediency.

7. The company has not provided Automatic Train Operation on all lines to ensure safer operation of trains.

8. Noise levels were beyond the permissible limits and there were premature wear and cracking in the wheel and floor of the rolling stock raising doubts on the stipulated 30 years’ design life.
9. The contract for manufacture, supply and commissioning of rolling stock was awarded with a condition that if the contractor failed to carry out the indigenous programme, it would be treated as default on his part attracting termination of the contract. There was, however, no provision for levy of any pecuniary penalty.

10. Audit analysis of quality control indicated scaling down of testing requirements, non-witnessing of tests by the company’s representatives, testing of material in non-accredited laboratories and non-preservation of test reports.
11. The company has acquired 32.38 lakh square metre of land for Phase I but has not
12. Maintained location wise data of land used for the Project and the property development. In nine locations the company has acquired total land of 6.42 lakh square metre, which was in excess of the Project requirement by 14 to 354 per cent.

13. The Government of India needs to analyze reasons for and effects of non-achievement of the objectives of adopting the broad gauge as envisaged by the Group of Ministers in August 2000. The company needs to document all factors which were involved in deciding on the broad gauge so that pros and cons of adopting any gauge by future projects are adequately identified.

14. The company should evolve a system of finalizing the cost estimates before inviting financial bids to maintain transparency and to ensure reasonableness of the offers received.

15. To enforce utilization of indigenous material by a contractor, explicit penalty clause should be incorporated in the contract agreement to serve as an adequate deterrent to the contractor.
16. The company should clearly indicate the land needed for the project as well as the area demarcated for property development at each location while requisitioning land. Surplus land that cannot be used for the intended purpose should be surrendered. Surplus revenue from property development activities of the Phase I should flow back to the Consolidated Fund of India.

17. Kolkata Metro, India's first and Asia’s fifth, was commissioned on 24 October 1984. Though the construction of Kolkata Metro was marred by inordinate delays and caused considerable public inconvenience

18. The JBIC committed a loan of Rs 6359 crore to the Project which is to be repaid by the company in 30 years with a moratorium of 10 years with effect from February 1997.
19. According to the DPR of 1995, 31.85 lakh passenger trips per day (i.e. rider ship) was expected on completion of the Project in the year 2005. The subsequent DPR of 2003 projected daily rider ship of 22.60 lakh. The highest daily average ridership attained was, however, 6.62 lakh only in November 2007, which was 21 per cent of the original projections and 29 per cent of the revised figure. The reasons for the shortfall in ridership were stated to be mainly as: (i) Higher fare structure of Metro in comparison to the other modes of Public Transport (Bus); (ii) For commuters the cost barrier went beyond the cost of Metro tickets, to also include cost of travel from the residence to the Metro Station and from the Metro Station to the workplace; (iii) Lack of proper connectivity; and (iv) Lack of feeder bus system for adjoining area to Metro System.

20. Despite low ridership, there was congestion on the Metro during peak hours. The congestion was attributable to various factors like lower number of passenger cars, sub-optimal speed over the rail network, lower frequency of trains, and absence of differential fares during peak hours.
21. There is no intersection between the mainline Railways and the MRTS network
22. And at a time of crisis, the Railways cannot mobilise back-up support for the MRTS network.
23. Metro stations have been designed for 3.20 metre wide coaches while the coach Width of mainline coaches including EMU coaches of Indian Railways is 3.66 metre.
24. Elevated structures of the Metro have been designed with axle loading of 16.5 ton, which is not compatible with the Indian Railway standard of Electrical Multiple Unit (EMU), which is 20 ton.
25. Platform length of a Metro station is designed for trains of eight coaches whereas the number of coaches in the mainline trains and EMU are generally more than eight.
26. the company incurred additional expenditure of Rs. 26.59 crore towards design cost for the 1500 V DC TS and extra conversion cost of 17 trains from 1500 V DC to 25 kV AC
27. The ATP, the ATO, the ATS and the SSI are essential safety technologies and must be used on all lines of the Metro. While the ATP and the ATS have been provided for all three lines, the ATO has been provided only in Line 2. ATO is not new technology.

28. The company should carry out tests under standard conditions and take corrective action if coaches experience higher levels of noise. As premature cracks in wheels are linked with safety issues, the company should carry out in-depth analysis and work out a technical solution.
29. The company followed guidelines of the JBIC in case of the JBIC funded contracts. The company has, however, not documented guidelines, policy and procedures for domestically funded contracts.

30. The JBIC guidelines for the appointment of the GC provided for financial negotiations only with the first ranked technical bidder. So, the selection of the GC was not based on a system where the best bid was selected on the basis of technical quality cum cost basis.
31. Financial bid of the highest ranked technical bidder viz., PCI led consortium of
32. Rs. 347.38 crore (exclusive of taxes, duties, levies and escalation) was opened and after negotiations, the contract was awarded at a price of Rs. 208.15 crore.

33. The company needs to further strengthen its system of processing of bids to bring in more accountability, transparency and fairness.

34. For effecting recoveries from the contractor (MC 1B contract) towards exemption
35. Of duties on supply of equipment, the company applied the rates applicable on the date of import/supplies, which were lower as compared to the rates prevailing on the date of submission of bids. This resulted in short-recovery of Rs. 14.41 crore towards excise duty (Rs. 9.50 crore) and customs duty (Rs. 4.91 crore). The management stated (April 2008) that the actual benefit, which could have accrued to the contractor on account of exemption, was only to be recovered from the contractor as per the contract. The reply is not tenable, as the rate applicable on the date of submission of bids, should have been the basis for effecting recoveries.
36. During execution of the MCIA contract, the company allowed the contractor
37. (October 2002) to replace 20-30 per cent of cement by fly ash for structural concrete subject to adjustment in contract price. However, the company did not recover Rs. 3.47 crore on this account, as the contractor argued that non-replacement of part cement with fly ash would have led to inferior concrete. The management stated (April 2008) that no adjustment was made as the use of fly ash was permitted as per the technical conditions. The reply is not acceptable because saving was to be passed on to the company as per the technical conditions and according to the IIT non-replacement of part cement would not have led to inferior concrete.

38. In respect of four contracts the company allowed (September 2003) inadmissible claims of Rs. 4.43 crore to contractors towards price variation by revising the price variation formula for aggregates. This price variation should not have been allowed because of the failure of the contractors to adhere to the existing law.

39. A contractor, while executing the work of bridge across river Yamuna, proposed a new design for construction of one pier, which did not require sand filling in remaining 14 wells. The company accepted the proposal and paid Rs. 10.89 lakh for this. Though the contractor has not filled sand in 14 wells, the company has released the payment of Rs. 49.43 lakh towards sand filling on the plea that it was a lump sum contract.

40. Recommendation No.13 - To enforce utilization of indigenous material by a contractor, explicit penalty clause should be incorporated in the contract agreement to serve as an adequate deterrent to the contractor.
41. The company did not allow the contractor to demobilise the welding plant, though the welding work had been completed in one section (R2) of RC3 contract. As the plant remained idle for five months (April-August 2003), the company had to pay the contractor Rs. 1.43 crore. The management stated (April 2008) that the plant was essential equipment having a bearing on the completion of the Project and thus a decision was taken not to allow the contractor to demobilise it. However, as the contractor had assured the demobilisation of the plant at the appropriate time, the company should have allowed the demobilisation and avoided payment of Rs. 1.43 crore.

42. It was observed that test reports were not preserved. The management stated (April 2008) that it was not possible to keep records of all the tests conducted, as there were millions of tests and once the quality was certified by the engineers based on these tests, it was considered not necessary to keep the records of all these tests which would involve additional expenditure. In any case, the company was able to get the works done with international quality standards. The reply is not tenable because if any instance of failure occurs at a later stage, then the quality certificate of the engineer cannot be reviewed in the absence of test reports.

43. Recommendation No. 14 - In order to keep the records of test conducted, the company needs to lay down a preservation life for test reports. It also needs to evolve a mechanism for testing of material through accredited laboratories.

Conclusion of CAG -
The Delhi MRTS Phase I Project has been widely assessed as a success story in
Project implementation that is worth emulating in other projects.

Reality Views - One city project success does not guarantee the success in other cities. The citizens have to keep eyes open.
In India majority officials are lazy or corrupt.

To Read the full CAG Report below is the link you can read it.


Anonymous,  June 17, 2010  

The video is good. Pune is the worst planned city I have ever seen. They say if you can drive in Pune, you can drive anywhere in the world!

chitra June 17, 2010  

Pune is the city I yearned to settle down once upon a time. But finding it difficult to see the sorry state of the place.
the place I stay at present is no different. Big crates as if asteroids have fallen, indifferent attitude of Municipality, never ending drainage work has made living difficult here also.

sm,  June 18, 2010  

Yes you are right about the saying.
They say if you can drive in Pune, you can drive anywhere in the world!

sm,  June 18, 2010  

they are just wasting our money

Kavita Saharia June 18, 2010  
This comment has been removed by the author.
Kavita Saharia June 18, 2010  

I have never been to Pune but think that majority of cities of our country face similar problems.New projects are finalized without sorting out the basic problems first.

The report clearly shows that many important issues have been ignored especially point no 23,22,24.Whereas points 36-39 indicate a lot of wastage of money.Any lesson learnt..i doubt .

sm,  June 20, 2010  


Admin June 24, 2010  

Very rightly said..SM. This is being discussed here a lot. I don't know about its outcome but it is never going to be an easy task. Let us wait and watch.

SM June 25, 2010  


sanjana,  June 25, 2010  

The video is good.